

# Interpreting the Cognition Underlying Behaviour


Problems with Parsimony

# Interpreting Behaviour

## Morgan's Canon

An influential **parsimony principle** that guides interpretations of animal behaviour in contemporary comparative psychology.

In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of **higher psychological** processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand **lower in the scale** of psychological evolution and development. (**Morgan 1894**)



Conwy Lloyd Morgan

# Parsimony principles

- Morgan's Canon raises a number of questions.

(1) What are 'lower' processes in the scale of psychological evolution and development?

- By the lights of evolution, all extant cognitive processes are equally evolved.



# Parsimony principles

- Consensus: ‘higher processes’ include metacognition, metarepresentation, reason, inference.
  - May be cognitively undemanding correlates – e.g. metacognitive emotions (Proust 2012; Michaelian 2016).
- Many arguments for lean attributions are driven by unexplicated intuition pumps.



# Parsimony principles

(2) When is it necessary to invoke 'higher' processes?

- Some interpretations are justified by **behaviour**.
- Some justified by further **explanatory goals**.
  - Explanatory pressures emphasise differences between humans and animals.
- Philosophical theorising drives some rich attributions.
  - Contentious philosophical claims may be **accepted uncritically** by psychologists (etc).



# Interpreting behaviour by appeal to parsimony

- All great ape species gesture communicatively.

Tomasello (2008), Scott-Phillips (2015):

- We should attribute meaning to infant but not great ape gestures – because only infants acquire language, which requires communicative intent.
  - Same behaviour, different underlying cognition.
  - Motivated by parsimony.



# Parsimony considerations can pull in different directions

## Sober (2005): Cladistic Parsimony

- Where comparable behaviours are present in neighbouring clades, it is parsimonious to assume a common underlying cognitive mechanism that evolved in an ancestral trait.
  - Same behaviour, same underlying cognition.
  - Also motivated by parsimony.




# The great ape family tree



Human  
(*Homo sapiens*)

Chimpanzee  
(*Pan troglodytes*)

Bonobo  
(*Pan paniscus*)



Scenario 1: Gestures emerge at T1, with common underlying mechanism.

- Similar trait, same mechanism at T3

Scenario 2: Gestures emerge at T1, with a common underlying mechanism, enriched in *Homo* clade at T2.

- Similar trait, different mechanisms

Scenario 3: Gestures emerge independently in *Homo* and *Pan* clades at T2, different underlying mechanisms.

- Similar trait, different mechanisms

Scenario 1 is cladistically parsimonious because it posits only one genetic change.



# Cladistic parsimony vs. Morgan's Canon

Cladistic parsimony preserves

- evolutionary gradualism
- continuity across species



However CP and MC can pull in different directions.

- Casual appeals to parsimony don't adequately justify assumptions about particular cognitive models.
- Must be argued carefully, on a case by case basis.



# References

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